For instance, within the state of affairs illustrated within the determine above, the shared sequence of tokens may be “Mechanism Design for”. The distributions may be [(“Large”, 0.8), (“Generative”, 0.2)] for the LLM of Agent 1, (“Giant”, 1.0) for the LLM of Agent 2, and (“Generative”, 1.0) for the LLM of Agent 3. The bids may be 1, 2, and a pair of, respectively. A attainable aggregated distribution could be the bid-weighted common of the distributions, particularly [(“Large”, 0.56), (“Generative”, 0.44)]. A attainable selection for the funds could be to ask every agent to pay their bid, which might have the brokers commit 1, 2, and a pair of, respectively.

For our theoretical evaluation of this mannequin (and choices of distribution aggregation features and fee features), we assume that the brokers honestly report their distributions, however could also be strategic about their bids. We consider this can be a lifelike assumption, as LLMs encode preferences over output textual content in a succinct and non-obvious manner. Furthermore, to ensure that the token public sale to have the ability to combination distributions, we have to have (a minimum of) some (minimal) details about agent’s preferences away from their “most well-liked” distributions. Our method right here is to imagine that the brokers have (recognized) partial desire orders over distributions. That’s, we assume that brokers could possibly rank some, however not all, pairs of distributions.